



Within the context of general relativity, we consider a type of “time machine”
and introduce the related “hole machine”. We review what is known about
each and add results of our own. We conclude that (so far) the hole machine
advocate is in a better position than the time machine advocate.
2 Background Structure
We begin with a few preliminaries concerning the relevant background formal-
ism of general relativity.1 An n-dimensional, relativistic spacetime (for n ≥ 2)
is a pair of mathematical objects (M, gab). M is a connected n-dimensional
manifold (without boundary) that is smooth (infinitely differentiable). Here,
gab is a smooth, non-degenerate, pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz signa-
ture (+,−, ...,−) defined on M . Each point in the manifold M represents an
“event” in spacetime.
For each point p ∈ M , the metric assigns a cone structure to the tangent
space Mp. Any tangent vector ξ
a in Mp will be timelike (if gabξ
aξb > 0), null (if
gabξ
aξb = 0), or spacelike (if gabξ
aξb < 0). Null vectors create the cone structure;
timelike vectors are inside the cone while spacelike vectors are outside. A time
orientable spacetime is one that has a continuous timelike vector field on M . A
time orientable spacetime allows us to distinguish between the future and past
lobes of the light cone. In what follows, it is assumed that spacetimes are time
orientable.
For some interval I ⊆ R, a smooth curve γ : I →M is timelike if the tangent
vector ξa at each point in γ[I] is timelike. Similarly, a curve is null (respectively,
spacelike) if its tangent vector at each point is null (respectively, spacelike). A
curve is causal if its tangent vector at each point is either null or timelike. A
∗I thank Thomas Barrett, Erik Curiel, John Earman, Bob Geroch, Chris Smeenk, Jim
Weatherall, Chris Wu¨thrich, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.
1The reader is encouraged to consult Wald (1984) and Malament (2012) for details. An
outstanding (and less technical) survey of the global structure of spacetime is given by Geroch
& Horowitz (1979).
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causal curve is future-directed if its tangent vector at each point falls in or on
the future lobe of the light cone.
For any two points p, q ∈M , we write p << q if there exists a future-directed
timelike curve from p to q. We write p < q if there exists a future-directed causal
curve from p to q. These relations allow us to define the timelike and causal
pasts and futures of a point p: I−(p) = {q : q << p}, I+(p) = {q : p << q},
J−(p) = {q : q < p}, and J+(p) = {q : p < q}. Naturally, for any set S ⊆ M ,
define J+[S] to be the set ∪{J+(x) : x ∈ S} and so on. A closed timelike curve
is a timelike curve γ : I → M such that there are distinct points s, s′ ∈ I with
γ(s) = γ(s′).
A point p ∈ M is a future endpoint of a future-directed causal curve γ :
I → M if, for every neighborhood O of p, there exists a point t0 ∈ I such that
γ(t) ∈ O for all t > t0. A past endpoint is defined similarly. For any set S ⊆M ,
we define the past domain of dependence of S (written D−(S)) to be the set of
points p ∈ M such that every causal curve with past endpoint p and no future
endpoint intersects S. The future domain of dependence of S (written D+(S))
is defined analogously. The entire domain of dependence of S (written D(S)) is
just the set D−(S) ∪D+(S).
We say a curve γ : I → M is not maximal if there is another curve γ′ :
I ′ → M such that I is a proper subset of I ′ and γ(s) = γ′(s) for all s ∈ I. A
curve γ : I → M in a spacetime (M, gab) is a geodesic if ξa∇aξb = 0 where ξa
is the tangent vector and ∇a is the unique derivative operator compatible with
gab. A spacetime (M, gab) is geodesically complete if every maximal geodesic
γ : I → M is such that I = R. We say that a future-directed timelike or null
geodesic γ : I → M without future endpoint is future incomplete if there is an
r ∈ R such that s < r for all s ∈ I. A past incomplete timelike or null geodesic
is defined analogously.
A set S ⊂ M is achronal if no two points in S can be connected by a
timelike curve. The edge of a closed, achronal set S ⊂ M is the set of points
p ∈ S such that every open neighborhood O of p contains a point q ∈ I+(p), a
point r ∈ I−(p), and a timelike curve from r to q which does not intersect S.
A set S ⊂ M is a slice if it is closed, achronal, and without edge. A spacetime
(M, gab) which contains a slice S such that D(S) = M is said to be globally
hyperbolic. A set S ⊂ M is a spacelike surface if S is an (n - 1)-dimensional
submanifold (possibly with boundary) such that every curve in S is spacelike.
Finally, two spacetimes (M, gab) and (M
′, g′ab) are isometric if there is a
diffeomorphism ψ : M → M ′ such that ψ∗(gab) = g′ab. We say a spacetime
(M ′, g′ab) is an extension of (M, gab) if there is a subset N of M
′ such that
(M, gab) and (N, g
′
ab|N ) are isometric. We say a spacetime is maximal if it has
no extension other than itself. A spacetime (M, gab) is past maximal if, for each
of its maximal extensions (M ′, g′ab) with isometric embedding ψ : M →M ′, we
have I−(ψ(M)) = ψ(M). A future maximal spacetime is defined analogously.
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3 Time Machines
One wonders if closed timelike curves (CTCs), which allow for time travel of
a certain type, can be “created” by rearranging the distribution and flow of
matter (Stein, 1970). In other words, can a physically reasonable spacetime
contain a “time machine” of sorts? Here, we examine one way of formalizing
the question due to Earman, Smeenk, & Wu¨thrich (2009), Earman & Wu¨thrich
(2010), and Smeenk & Wu¨thrich (2011).
Consider a past maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime (M, gab). It repre-
sents a “time” before the machine is switched on.2 We would like to capture the
idea that this spacetime “creates” CTCs. Accordingly, we can require that ev-
ery “physically reasonable” maximal extension of (M, gab) must contain CTCs.
Consider the following statement.
(T) There is a past maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime (M, gab)
such that every maximal extension of (M, gab) with property p con-
tains CTCs.
We seek to find physically reasonable “potency” properties p which make
(T) true. And we know from counterexamples constructed by Krasnikov (2002)
that (T) will be false unless there is a potency property p which limits spacetime
“holes” in some sense.
Are there any properties p which make (T) true? Yes. We say a space-
time (M, gab) is hole-free if, for any spacelike surface S in M there is no iso-
metric embedding θ : D(S) → M ′ into another spacetime (M ′, g′ab) such that
θ(D(S)) 6= D(θ(S)). It has been argued that all physically reasonable space-
times are hole-free (Clarke, 1976). And it turns out that (T) is true if p is
hole-freeness (Manchak, 2009a). The two-dimensional Misner spacetime can be
used to prove the result. However, it seems hole-freeness cannot be regarded as
physically reasonable potency property after all; it turns out (!) that Minkowski
spacetime is not hole-free (Krasnikov, 2009).
Because hole-freeness fails to be physically reasonable, one seeks more ap-
propriate alternate potency properties to rule out holes. Here, we consider two
such.3 First we have (Manchak, 2014):
Definition A spacetime (M, gab) is E complete if, for every future or past in-
complete timelike geodesic γ : I →M , and every open set O containing γ, there
is no isometric embedding ϕ : O →M ′ into some other spacetime (M ′, g′ab) such
that ϕ ◦ γ has future and past endpoints.
One can show that every geodesically complete spacetime (e.g. Minkowski
spacetime) is E complete (Manchak, 2014). In this sense, E completeness is a
more appropriate condition than hole-freeness.
2All globally hyperbolic spacetimes fail to have CTCs (Wald, 1984).
3For others, see Clarke (1993), Manchak (2009b), and Minguzzi (2012).
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Our second condition is:
Definition. A spacetime (M, gab) is J closed if, for all p ∈ M , the sets J+(p)
and J−(p) are closed.
One can show that every globally hyperbolic spacetime (e.g. Minkowski
spacetime) is J closed (Hawking & Sachs, 1974). In this sense, J closedness is a
more appropriate condition than hole-freeness.
Now we are in a position to ask two precise questions: Is (T) true when p is
E completeness? J closedness? Let’s begin with the first question. We have:
Proposition 1. If p is E completeness, (T) is true.
Proof. Let (N, ηab) be a Misner spacetime. So, N = R × S and ηab =
2∇(at∇b)ϕ + t∇aϕ∇bϕ where the points (t, ϕ) are identified with the points
(t, ϕ+2pin) for all integers n. Let (M, gab) be such that M = {(t, ϕ) ∈ N : t < 0}
and gab = ηab|M . One can verify that (M, gab) is a past maximal, globally hy-
perbolic spacetime.
Let (M ′′, g′′ab) be any extension whatsoever to (M, gab). For convenience, take
the associated isometric embedding ψ : M → M ′′ to be the identity function.
In (M ′′, g′′ab) there will be a future incomplete timelike geodesic γ : I → M
with past endpoint at (−1, 0); the geodesic winds around the spacetime, ever
approaching but never meeting t = 0 (Hawking & Ellis, 1973).
Let (M ′, g′ab) be such that M
′ = R×S and g′ab = −2∇(at′∇b)ϕ′+t′∇aϕ′∇bϕ′
where the points (t′, ϕ′) are identified with the points (t′, ϕ′ + 2pin) for all inte-
gers n. We know (M ′, g′ab) is an extension of (M, gab) (Hawking & Ellis, 1973);
let ψ′ : M → M ′ be the associated isometric embedding. One can verify that
ψ′◦γ has past endpoint at t′ = −1 and future endpoint at t′ = 0. Thus (M ′′, g′′ab)
is not E complete. Thus, since (M ′′, g′′ab) was arbitrary, every maximal, E com-
plete extension of (M, gab) contains CTCs. 
Now observe: in the proof above, (M, gab) renders (T) true but it does so
only vacuously. There do not exist any maximal, E complete extensions of
(M, gab); so all of them must contain CTCs. This suggests a minor alteration
to (T).
(T*) There is a past maximal, globally hyperbolic space-time (M, gab)
such that (i) there is a maximal extension of (M, gab) with property
p and (ii) every such extension contains CTCs.
Is (T*) true when p is E completeness? This is presently unknown. Is (T*)
true when p is J closedness? Yes. A proof, using Misner spacetime, is given in
Manchak (2011). We have:
Proposition 2. If p is J closedness, (T*) is true.
4
4 Hole Machines?
Are J closedness and E completeness physically reasonable properties to impose
on spacetime? In the present context, our investigation has centered upon the
“no hole” properties of (presumably reasonable) past maximal, globally hyper-
bolic spacetimes and their maximal extensions. Therefore, it seems appropriate,
at least for the time being, to require p to be such that, for any past maximal,
globally hyperbolic spacetime, there is at least a chance that there is a maximal
extension of that spacetime with p. This idea (or something close to it) was
considered by Clarke (1976), Earman (1989), and Manchak (2009b). Consider
the following:
Definition. A property p is future Cauchy extendible if, for every past maximal,
globally hyperbolic spacetime (M, gab), there is a maximal extension of (M, gab)
with property p.
We now have two more precise questions: Is E completeness future Cauchy
extendible? Is J closedness? No and no. The E completeness case follows di-
rectly from the proof of proposition 1. We have:
Proposition 3. E completeness is not future Cauchy extendible.
Proof. Let (M, gab) be the past maximal, globally hyperbolic portion of Mis-
ner spacetime. As outlined in proposition 1, any extension (maximal or not) to
(M, gab) fails to be E complete. 
The J closedness case was conjectured by Geroch (private communication).
The result is somewhat surprising; we would expect a (globally hyperbolic and
thus) J closed spacetime to have some J closed maximal extension. Instead, we
have:
Proposition 4. J closedness is not future Cauchy extendible.
Proof. Let (N, ηab) be a Misner spacetime. So, N = R × S and ηab =
2∇(at∇b)ϕ + t∇aϕ∇bϕ where the points (t, ϕ) are identified with the points
(t, ϕ + 2pin) for all integers n. Now let (N ′, η′ab) be a spacetime such that
N ′ = N − {(0, 0)} and η′ab = Ω2ηab where Ω : N ′ → R approaches zero as the
point (0, 0) is approached along the line {(t, ϕ) ∈ N ′ : ϕ = 0 & t < 0}. Let
(M, gab) be such that M = {(t, ϕ) ∈ N ′ : t < 0} and gab = η′ab|M . One can
verify that (M, gab) is past maximal, globally hyperbolic.
Let (M ′, g′ab) be any maximal extension of (M, gab). Now, for every k ∈
[0, 2pi], let γk be the null geodesic whose image is the set {(t, ϕ) ∈ M : ϕ =
k & − 1 < t < 0}. Now, for each k, γk either has a future endpoint pk or not.
Let K be the set of all the endpoints pk. Because (M
′, g′ab) is maximal, there
will certainly be some k such that the point pk is in K. But since Ω approaches
zero as the point (0, 0) is approached along γ0, the point p0 does not exist.
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Hence, K is not (the image of) a closed null curve. This implies that there will
be some point q ∈ J+(pk)∩K such that q /∈ J−(pk). But of course, q ∈ J−(pk)
since q ∈ K. So J−(pk) is not a closed set and, therefore, (M ′, g′ab) is not J
closed. 
Given these results, a time machine skeptic might conclude that (T*) unrea-
sonably restricts attention only to maximal extensions which satisfy p. After all,
propositions 3 and 4 seem to show us that (presumably) reasonable spacetimes
do not always have maximal extensions which are E complete or J closed. In
fact, one might argue that these results actually support the existence of “hole
machines” of a certain type. Consider the following statement:
(H) There is a past maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime (M, gab)
such that every maximal extension of (M, gab) fails to have property
p.
One could seek “no hole” properties p which make (H) true. As before,
the past maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetime (M, gab) represents a “time”
before the hole machine is switched on.4 Requiring that every maximal exten-
sion of (M, gab) fail to have p captures the idea that this spacetime “creates”
holes. Notice that an existence clause, as in (T*), is not needed here since every
spacetime has a maximal extension (Geroch, 1970). Of course, as corollaries to
propositions 3 and 4, we have:
Proposition 5. If p is E completeness, (H) is true.
Proposition 6. If p is J closedness, (H) is true.
We see that, if p is J closedness, the time machine advocate and hole ma-
chine advocate each have a result in hand. But this is not the case if p is E
completeness; as noted before, it is still an open question whether (T*) is true
if p is E completeness. So we see one sense in which (so far) the hole machine
advocate is in a better position than the time machine advocate.
But there are other (more serious) senses in which (so far) the hole machine
advocate is in a better position than the time machine advocate. Consider the
presuppositions made by each. Both advocates seem to presume that all past
maximal, globally hyperbolic spacetimes are physically reasonable. And both
presume that all physically reasonable extensions to such globally hyperbolic
regions must be maximal. But the hole machine advocate requires no potency
properties to deduce the existence of holes. In (H), one considers all maximal
extensions of (M, gab); no demarcation between the reasonable and unreasonable
is presumed.
4One cannot require (M, gab) to have property p since some “no hole” properties (e.g. E
completeness) imply the maximality of spacetime (Manchak, 2014). But all globally hyperbolic
spacetimes (M, gab) have the property of “internal causal compactness”: for all points p, q ∈
M , the closure of I−(p) ∩ I+(q) is compact. This property “excludes holes” in some sense
(Geroch & Horowitz, 1979, 251).
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And not only is it potentially problematic to demarcate between the reason-
able and unreasonable extensions. But in fact (one might argue) the demarca-
tions presumed (so far) are suspect. After all, propositions 5 and 6 show a sense
in which J closedness and E completeness are not satisfied by all physically rea-
sonable spacetimes. Why, then, should the time machine advocate be permitted
to use these properties as potency properties?5
5 Conclusion
What can the time machine advocate do to better her position? It seems she
must reject the presumption that all past maximal, globally hyperbolic space-
times are physically reasonable. Consider the following statements:
(T**) There is a past-maximal, globally hyperbolic space-time (M, gab)
with property q such that (i) there is a maximal extension of (M, gab)
with property p and (ii) every such extension contains CTCs.
(H**) There is a past-maximal, globally hyperbolic space-time (M, gab)
with property q such that such that every maximal extension of
(M, gab) fails to have property p
Here, q is some “local” property (e.g. an “energy condition”) satisfied by
physically reasonable spacetimes (Manchak, 2013). As before, p is some “no
holes” property. The time machine advocate can hope that, for some choices
of p and q, (T**) winds up being true and (H**) winds up being false. But
it is not yet clear which of the two advocates benefits more from limiting the
discussion in this way. There is more work to be done here.
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